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The latest book by Daniel Dennett, From bacte-
ria to Bach and back. The evolution of minds (2017), 
is the umpteenth proof of his scholarship. It is more 
than an essay: it is the final reflection of a philoso-
pher who seems to come to the final thesis in a life-
long work in the philosophy of mind and life. Prob-
ably no one, not even his enemies, wishes to witness 
the final step in Dennett’s career; however, with 
this book, he looks set to define his theoretical tes-
tament and philosophical legacy. 
As he has, on several occasions, remarked, the 
Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at 
Tufts University indulges his passion for allitera-
tion in the title, which hints at the tripartite plot of 
the book. Thus, a caution is in order if you read 
the Italian edition: the title, although a good trans-
lation, unfortunately leaves out the final “...and 
back” of the English original. This is, indeed, sur-
prising, because it deprives the Italian version of 
the title’s original meaning.  
In a few words: everything significant on the 
face of this planet finds its origins in bacteria. Pro-
vided with the proper physical and chemical condi-
tions, bacteria can develop into very sophisticated 
forms of life. These forms of life may also reach cer-
tain peaks of development, where they acquire the 
capacity to monitor themselves. It is probably by 
following this trend that the most sophisticated 
forms of life – human beings, in particular – devel-
op a very special system for self-monitoring: minds, 
which, in some cases, can be identified as conscious. 
This is the leading topic in part 1 of the book, 
which considers the evolution of bacteria. Dennett 
is a master at depicting this multicolored, com-
pound, and complete story (as he calls it) that is 
both deeply coherent and rational. This story ap-
pears extremely reasonable thanks to the theoreti-
cal framework he adopts: evolutionary darwinism. 
In short, Dennett embraces explanatory naturalism. 
Even though evolutionary explanations enable 
us to make sense of the story of natural life; they 
do not account for what is more intrinsically hu-
man: culture and cultural phenomena. This has 
been a traditional objection to Darwinian natural-
ism. Yet Dennett employs the second part of his 
book (part 2) building the argument that culture 
and cultural phenomena can essentially be treated 
in the same way. How? He extends the notion of 
the “meme”, which he explicitly borrows from 
Richard Dawkins, in a rather original way. He pro-
poses the meme be considered the cultural coun-
terpart of a gene, in order to clarify the mechanisms 
of diffusion followed by certain structures of in-
formation: free floating rationales, namely, basic, in-
dependent, information structures which, because 
of certain (lucky) circumstances, are successful, or 
more successful than others. As humans became 
more and more complex along their evolutionary 
path, they needed to develop ever greater agility in 
implementing information. Thus, their brains be-
came ever more complex along with their minds. 
This growing complexity forced human beings to 
improve how they managed information. The natu-
ral step for a community of animals who are highly 
interactive and who deal with a huge amount of in-
formation is to share it. In order to share infor-
mation, they have to develop a complex system for 
communication. The memetic units that humans 
use to spread and to extract information from their 
environment work as catalysts for their communica-
tive needs: thus, language enters the scene, as an op-
timal vehicle for the optimal organization of memes 
(Dennett thinks of words as memes). Human culture 
hinges on just such a trick: more memes, more com-
plexity, more communication, and so on … until we 
find our world as it is and has been for the last two or 
three thousand years. And then, a certain German 
kid pops out in Eisenach and, again, making use of 
this and that meme, composes Cello Suite no. 1 in G 
major – that’s Bach. 
That is, roughly, Dennett’s recipe for life and 
mind, which is properly suited to an evolutionary 
and naturalistic style of explanation for most, if 
not all of the phenomena that philosophers have 
been contending with since the beginning of phi-
losophy. This general framework is nowadays a 
fairly consolidated approach, shared by Richard 
Dawkins, Kim Sterelny, Peter Godfrey-Smith, as 
well as several others. Dennett also adds a third 
part to the book that reads like a broad review – 
indeed, those who do not feel like reading the 
whole book could just start at page 336 and read a 
few pages to get a general idea. However – this 
third section can be considered to address the way 
back mentioned in the title – also includes a num-
ber of considerations that make Dennett’s bold 
naturalist attitude seem a little less forceful. The 
memetic strategy works best when accounting for 
a civilized world, with memes described as pat-
terns of information that spread in an autono-
mous way; our deeply artificial and technological 
world is an optimal environment for their prolif-
eration. In fact, as Dennett points out, here and 
there, especially in chapter 15, memes could pro-
ceed with a life of their own, escaping the grip of 
our understanding, while remaining darwinistical-
ly oriented. This is the scenario for a potential de-
darwinization, a trend that, in some cases, seems 
Recensioni 
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA 
DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2021.0019 
 
ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629  
Vol. 12 (2021), n. 2, pp. 207-209    
 
208                     Recensioni 
 
 
to reverse the natural evolutionary path. It is with-
in this scenario that human life could put the 
whole world at risk and, consequently, endanger 
itself. And it is mainly because of the inability of 
human beings to understand their own artifacts 
(the most complex ones) that mankind runs this 
risk of extinction, though this need not necessarily 
be our fate: «civilization is a work in progress, and 
we abandon our attempt to understand it at our 
peril» (p. 410). Such a disquieting scenario resem-
bles some of Heidegger’s later speculations. Some 
continental critics of the naturalist trend of much of 
anglophone, post-analytic philosophy, might con-
sider these afterthoughts with a certain interest. 
Maybe the juxtaposition of the dennettian doc-
trine, an evolutionary doctrine, and the luddite 
disapproval of progress and technology expressed 
by Martin Heidegger is somewhat provocative. 
Yet, Daniel Dennett is open-minded enough that 
he will not be appalled by the analogy. The real is-
sues he considers to be at stake are others.  
Indeed, so ambitious, so broad, and so compre-
hensive is the book that there are many topics wor-
thy of discussion; they are too many and too com-
plex for a quick and light review. Yet, there are some 
crucial questions that, though debated at some 
length by the author, are never definitively clarified.  
In part 1, Dennett provides a – by now – well-
known account of the development of entities 
with minds, which hinges on the notion of “com-
petence without comprehension”. There are no 
special elements which are constitutive of the 
mind, contrary to the beliefs held by those who 
have inherited the legacy of Descartes (what Den-
nett calls “Cartesian gravity”). Every cognitive 
competence is the result of practices that just hap-
pened to favor one living being among many, 
whose survival contributed to the success of its 
lineage. And competences, including cognitive 
ones, are traits carved by the forces of natural se-
lection and acquired mechanically thanks to a ge-
netic code. These cognitive endowments, even 
among human beings, remain largely obscure, be-
low or beyond comprehension. Of course, it has 
taken an enormous intellectual effort to get rid of 
our conviction that our mind is qualitatively dif-
ferent from our brain. Our mind, instead, is our 
brain; better, it is the activity that is implemented 
by our brain. In order to finally grasp this point 
along the history of human thought, Dennett 
claims that we had to absorb at least two basic 
general inversions of reasoning. One is Darwin’s 
dangerous idea that there is no need to appeal to a 
superior mind to explain the extraordinary level of 
design revealed by the nature and function of hu-
man beings. Natural evolution employs dumb and 
efficient tricks, based on replication, spread, and 
selection, which refine this design without any need 
for an (intelligent) designer. The other inversion of 
reasoning is the intuition of Alan Turing: some 
mechanisms work better without ever understand-
ing what they are doing at all. Turing conceived of a 
machine that can perform procedures that solve 
computational problems in a strictly mechanical 
way, without any comprehension. Thus, we know 
that most of our capacities are the inheritance of 
our species and we do not need to have special in-
gredients for such competences to arise, even at 
higher levels. So far, so good; but then how do we 
come to understand our experience, and why? The 
answer that Dennett provides is not particularly 
exhaustive. Civilization and culture are involved 
as determinant factors that are complementary to 
natural evolution, but here the explanation be-
comes progressively blurrier. Technology (a prod-
uct of civilization and culture) is embodied in the 
environment in which we live; it interacts with 
human beings and they interact with it. The world 
is saturated with information that is structured in 
such a way that humans are affected by and affect 
it. However, the terms of this interaction and how 
it conditions the human mind and cognition are 
not clear. For sure, human beings require a power-
ful tool to deal with an environment that has to be 
endowed with meanings and that has to be seman-
tically interpreted: language.  
Yet, language and its origins present another 
weak spot in the explanatory story told by Den-
nett. He advises the reader that «A bird’s-eye view 
is all we need …» when addressing language (p. 
249). Then, after maintaining that «... a necessary 
precursor of language had to be some kind of pre-
linguistic cultural transmission supported by some 
kind of genetic adjustment...» (p. 251), our phi-
losopher rather hastily declares language to be the 
«... launching pad of human cognition and think-
ing» (p. 261). Likely, by launching pad, he means 
the outstanding cognitive human capacity to cre-
ate well-formed formulas in a recursive way: the 
sentences of our language; but how did we reach 
this launching pad from the necessary precursor of 
language? Dennett, again, gives us only a rough 
idea (for the whole of chapter 12), although he ap-
peals to a quite extensive literature on the theme. 
He is one singer in a choir, however, and his sketch 
of an explanatory narrative is in any case preferable 
to the current alternatives. As he notes, the hypoth-
esis – put forward by the father of Generative 
Grammar, Noam Chomsky – that a single great 
special mutation afforded human linguistic compe-
tence, is simply not plausible. As Dennett puts it: 
«The idea that a random mutation can transform a 
species in one fell swoop is not a remotely credible 
just so story; it has more in common with comic 
book fantasies like the Incredible Hulk and all the 
other action heroes whose encounters with freak 
accidents grant them superpowers» (p. 279-280). 
What is most commendable in this book by 
Dennett is his attempt to establish a coherent 
connection between natural evolution (based on 
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genes) and cultural evolution (based on memes). 
The account of life, mind, and world, he develops 
based on this link is broad and reassuring: it co-
vers all the bases, with no flaw … or so it seems. 
There is, in fact, a price to be paid for this well-
packed evolutionary parcel. The real patterns with 
which Dennett articulates this story are them-
selves memes. Memes are non-natural units of 
structured information that are successfully 
transmitted. So, what are memes, exactly? Dennett 
straightforwardly defines memes as ways of doing 
things, which are spread through experiences (dif-
fering in this respect from genes). Thus, memes 
are greetings, kisses, dance steps, practices used to 
fish out termites with a stick, refrains… it seems 
that memes are anything that propagates without 
being encoded in the nucleotide sequences in 
DNA or RNA: most probably, a meme is what a 
gene is not. This liberal characterization of a meme 
enables Dennett to provide his story with a coher-
ent theoretical framework; but he uses a theoretical 
notion that, because of its generality, tends to trivi-
alize those aspects of evolutionary explanations 
which, instead, require significant specificities (par-
ticularly with respect to phenomena which are nei-
ther natural nor obviously cultural).  
A last consideration is what role comprehension 
might play in any system, be it natural or, possibly, 
artificial. As Dennett suggests, comprehension, 































ject, although composed by several parts, is not nec-
essary but complementary. Yet in one of the last sec-
tions of his book (“What will happen to us?”, chap. 
15) he welcomes comprehension, because it may 
turn out to be crucial for monitoring the whole sys-
tem (or item, or collectivity) and for repairing it, in 
case of a breakdown: «The distribution of partial 
comprehension is not optional» (p. 408). Thus, can 
a system do without comprehension or not? Of 
course, it depends on the system, and if the system is 
complex enough, comprehension is necessary. This 
means that it cannot be considered facultative; it is 
not optional, as Dennett himself admits. Therefore, 
comprehension should not be underestimated, as he 
sometimes allows it to be. 
In conclusion, the last work by Dennett pro-
vides an excellent recapitulation of all of his earlier 
theses and includes some refinements with respect 
to his previous major works, thereby making his 
global picture more robust. It is most likely the 
best (as well as the most recent) introduction to 
his philosophy: a great landscape fresco portraying 
a variety of philosophical evolutionism. It is defi-
nitely worthwhile reading but, as in all landscape 
frescos, some (relevant) details are blurred. 
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